Money & Finance › Commercial real estate lending › CMBS delinquency waves (2009–12, 2020 and 2023–26)
Jamison Properties' CMBS office defaults in Los Angeles (2024–26)
2024–2026· Crisis or event
Fact, law or dataA rule, statute, definition or measured number.
Koreatown's largest commercial landlord saw several 2014-era CMBS office loans miss their maturities from 2024 as tenants left and values fell.
See it on the Money & Finance map →How it works
Jamison, a family-run Los Angeles landlord, financed towers with 10-year CMBS loans around 2014. Equitable Plaza, 3435 Wilshire, went to special servicing in 2024; its appraisal fell from $150.5 million to about $58 million. Downtown's 811 Wilshire, 36% occupied, missed its November 2024 maturity on about $35 million, and a sale failed. By January 2026 four loans, about $230 million, were with special servicers. Jamison called one transfer a strategic step toward refinancing.
Why it matters
It shows the non-recourse trade in practice: each loan stands alone, so losses are fought building by building while the rest of the portfolio, including apartment conversions, keeps borrowing.
Facts, rules and data
CMBS servicer commentary reported by Morningstar Credit, and coverage in The Real Deal, Commercial Observer, CoStar and Bisnow (2024–26). Jamison has said little publicly beyond calling one transfer a strategic step toward refinancing.
Debates and risks
Whether Equitable Plaza's planned October 2026 payoff closed, how 811 Wilshire's foreclosure ends, and whether bondholders take losses were not public at last report.
Connections (5)
▸Jamison Properties' CMBS office defaults in Los Angeles (2024–26) show the non-recourse model at work in CMBS: conduit loans pooled into commercial mortgage bondsFact, law or data
The connection
Jamison held many buildings in single-asset entities financed with 10-year CMBS loans, typically non-recourse. When those loans matured in 2024–25 with occupancy and values down, the lenders' main remedy was each building, not Jamison's wider portfolio. Special servicers such as LNR took over and negotiated building by building.
When and why
Koreatown and downtown Los Angeles; loans made around 2014 that matured in 2024–25.
How we know
CMBS servicer commentary via Morningstar Credit and trade press (The Real Deal, Commercial Observer, Bisnow); full loan terms sit in deal documents.
Debates and risks
Exactly which carve-outs or guarantees Jamison's principals signed is not public, so the limits of their personal exposure are unknown.
▸Jamison Properties' CMBS office defaults in Los Angeles (2024–26) won forbearance on some loans through Loan modifications and forbearance agreementsFact, law or data
The connection
Rather than hand back keys, Jamison sought time. 600 South Commonwealth got a one-year extension after its January 2024 maturity, then missed again in 2025. Equitable Plaza and Central Plaza got forbearance agreements; Equitable's was extended so Jamison could line up a refinance, with an October 2026 payoff date.
When and why
Negotiated with special servicers, including LNR, from 2024 through 2026.
How we know
Servicer commentary reported by Morningstar Credit, Commercial Observer (2025) and The Real Deal (July 2026).
Debates and risks
Whether the refinance closed, and on what terms against an appraisal of about $58 million, was not public at last report.
▸Jamison Properties' CMBS office defaults in Los Angeles (2024–26) left 811 Wilshire facing Commercial foreclosure: trustee's sales and judicial foreclosureFact, law or data
The connection
811 Wilshire, a 21-story downtown tower, missed its November 2024 maturity on about $35 million of debt with occupancy near 36%. Its appraisal fell from $68 million at the 2014 loan to $40.5 million. Jamison listed it with CBRE in 2025, but the sale fell through and the servicer moved toward foreclosure.
When and why
Downtown Los Angeles, 2024–25; special servicer LNR Partners; facing foreclosure by September 2025.
How we know
Morningstar Credit servicer commentary and reports by CoStar, Bisnow and The Real Deal.
Debates and risks
Whether the tower goes to a third-party buyer at a trustee's sale, to the lender, or is rescued by a late deal had not been reported.
▸Jamison Properties' CMBS office defaults in Los Angeles (2024–26) are a Los Angeles case of Commercial real estate stress (2023–)Fact, law or data
The connection
Remote work, downsizing tenants and higher rates hit older office towers hardest. Jamison's Koreatown and downtown buildings lost occupancy, some to under 40%, and appraisals fell roughly 40–60%: the national CRE stress in miniature. Jamison has responded partly by converting offices to apartments.
When and why
Los Angeles, 2023–26, when office vacancy ran around a quarter of space by brokers' counts.
How we know
Appraisal data in CMBS reports, broker vacancy surveys, and city records of Jamison's office-to-apartment conversions.
Debates and risks
Whether older Koreatown offices recover as offices or mostly become housing is uncertain.
▸Los Angeles office market (about 25% vacant) includes the towers behind Jamison Properties' CMBS office defaults in Los Angeles (2024–26)Fact, law or data
The connection
Jamison's troubled loans sit on Koreatown and Downtown towers, two of LA's weakest office areas. As tenants shrank or left, rents and occupancy fell, appraisals dropped sharply, and 10-year CMBS loans from around 2014 could not be refinanced at maturity. Market vacancy explains why no lender would refinance at the old loan amounts.
When and why
Wilshire Boulevard in Koreatown and Downtown Los Angeles, 2024–26; special servicers took over about four loans totaling roughly $230 million.
How we know
CMBS servicer reports summarized by Morningstar Credit and trade press, showing Equitable Plaza's appraisal falling from $150.5 million to about $58 million.
Debates and risks
How the remaining loans end, through extension, sale or foreclosure, and whether bondholders lose money, were not public at last report.