Geopolitics › Global issues & flashpoints › US–China strategic rivalry
Critical minerals and rare earths
China refines ~90% of rare earths· Resource or chokepoint
FactTreaties, membership, measured data, events.
Rare earths, lithium, cobalt, graphite and other minerals essential to electronics, EVs and weapons, whose processing China largely controls.
See it on the Geopolitics map →The picture
Rare earths are 17 metals; some, such as neodymium and dysprosium, make the powerful magnets in EV motors, wind turbines, missiles and fighter jets. China mines about 60–70% of rare earths but refines roughly 90% and makes over 90% of the magnets; it also leads in processing graphite, gallium, lithium and cobalt. Congo mines about 70% of cobalt and Indonesia most nickel. In 2025 Chinese export controls caused magnet shortages that briefly halted some Western car production.
Why it matters
Whoever controls processing can squeeze rivals' factories and arms makers; China used that leverage in 2025 trade talks, so the US and allies are racing to build alternatives.
Key facts and numbers
US Geological Survey Mineral Commodity Summaries, International Energy Agency critical-minerals outlooks, China's Commerce Ministry export-control notices, and carmakers' statements on the 2025 shortages.
What to watch
Outlook: how fast non-Chinese mines and refineries, backed by US equity stakes and price guarantees, can scale; most estimates say a decade or more.
Connections (9)
▸Lithium Triangle (Argentina, Bolivia, Chile) is part of Critical minerals and rare earthsFact
The relationship
Lithium is a key battery mineral on US, EU and Chinese critical lists. The Triangle holds about half the world's known resources, mostly as brine, while Australia mines more, from hard rock. But much Andean lithium ships to China to be processed into battery materials, so owning mines alone does not break China's grip on the supply chain.
Since when and why
Salt flats in the high Andes, such as Chile's Atacama, Argentina's Hombre Muerto and Bolivia's Uyuni.
How we know
USGS resource and production estimates, and Chilean and Argentine customs data showing China as the main buyer of their lithium.
What to watch
Whether new Western-backed refineries and US or EU trade deals redirect Andean lithium, and how water and indigenous concerns limit expansion.
▸Eastern Congo war (M23 and Rwanda) is fueled partly by Critical minerals and rare earthsWidely agreed
The relationship
Eastern Congo's coltan, tin, tungsten and gold give armed groups income. UN experts say M23 earns about $800,000 a month taxing coltan from the Rubaya mines, which supply roughly 15% of world tantalum, and that minerals are smuggled out through Rwanda. Congo's huge cobalt output comes mainly from the calmer southeast.
Since when and why
North and South Kivu; M23 took Rubaya in April 2024. US-brokered deals in 2025 tied peace to minerals investment.
How solid?
Widely agreed: UN Group of Experts reports cite export data and testimony, saying Rwanda's mineral exports exceed its own output; Kigali disputes this.
What to watch
Debated: whether minerals cause the war or mainly finance it, since ethnic security, land and Rwanda's fear of Hutu militias also drive it.
▸China (People's Republic of China) dominates Critical minerals and rare earthsFact
The relationship
Over decades China built the world's processing industry for rare earths, graphite, lithium, cobalt, gallium and germanium, helped by low costs, state support and lax early environmental rules. Since 2023 it has required export licenses for many of them; in October 2025 it announced sweeping new controls, then paused them under the Busan trade truce.
Since when and why
Inner Mongolia's Bayan Obo, the largest rare-earth mine; Jiangxi and Guangdong for heavy rare earths; Commerce Ministry controls from July 2023 onward.
How we know
USGS and IEA market-share data, Chinese export-control announcements, and customs data showing exports plunging after licensing began.
What to watch
Whether Beijing uses the leverage again when the truce lapses, and how much Western stockpiles and new mines blunt it.
▸China–Japan crisis over Taiwan remarks led to Chinese curbs on Critical minerals and rare earthsFact
The relationship
On January 6, 2026 China banned exports of dual-use items to Japanese military users or for any use that strengthens Japan's military. The list covers about 1,100 items, including medium and heavy rare earths such as dysprosium and terbium. Japan, which still got 63% of its rare-earth imports from China in 2024, saw supplies disrupted.
Since when and why
China's Commerce Ministry, Beijing, January 6, 2026; disruptions at Japanese firms were reported through 2026.
How we know
The Commerce Ministry announcement, Japanese government protests, and Japanese trade data on rare-earth imports.
What to watch
How broadly China enforces the ban against civilian firms, and how fast Japan's alternatives, such as Australian supplier Lynas, can fill the gap; China also squeezed Japan's rare earths in 2010.
▸Indonesia dominates nickel in Critical minerals and rare earthsFact
The relationship
Indonesia mines about 60% of the world's nickel, used in stainless steel and EV batteries. By fully banning raw-ore exports in 2020 it forced miners to build smelters at home, mostly with Chinese capital, turning it into a processing giant; the flood of supply sank prices and closed many Australian mines.
Since when and why
Industrial parks such as Morowali in Sulawesi and Weda Bay in North Maluku, built with firms like China's Tsingshan from the 2010s on.
How we know
US Geological Survey production data, a 2022 WTO panel ruling against the ore ban, which Indonesia appealed, and company records.
What to watch
Whether Chinese ownership keeps Indonesian nickel out of US subsidy and supply programs, and the environmental cost of coal-powered smelters and deforestation.
▸Myanmar civil war disrupts heavy rare-earth supply in Critical minerals and rare earthsWidely agreed
The relationship
Myanmar's Kachin State became a major source of heavy rare earths, such as dysprosium and terbium, mined cheaply and often illegally, then trucked to China for processing. In October 2024 the Kachin Independence Army, an ethnic rebel force, seized the main mining hub near the Chinese border, and China has used border closures to pressure it, disrupting supply.
Since when and why
Pangwa and Chipwe in Kachin State, near China's Yunnan province; mining boomed after China tightened rules at home in the late 2010s.
How solid?
Global Witness investigations, Chinese customs import data and USGS figures, which rank Myanmar among the top three rare-earth miners.
What to watch
Who controls each mine and how much ore still reaches China is unclear; reports of rebels courting Western buyers are unconfirmed.
▸Australia is a key non-China supplier in Critical minerals and rare earthsFact
The relationship
Australia mines about a third of the world's lithium and hosts Lynas, the largest rare-earth producer outside China, which in 2025 began separating heavy rare earths at its Malaysian plant. In October 2025 Australia and the US signed a framework to co-fund an $8.5 billion pipeline of projects. Most Australian lithium ore still goes to China for refining.
Since when and why
Pilbara lithium mines and Lynas's Mount Weld and Kalgoorlie sites in Western Australia; framework signed by Trump and Albanese at the White House, October 20, 2025.
How we know
USGS production data, Lynas company reports, and the published US–Australia Critical Minerals Framework.
What to watch
Whether Western-backed processing in Australia can compete on cost with China, and how quickly new refineries reach full output.
▸Critical minerals and rare earths were a key bargaining chip in US–China trade truceFact
The relationship
China refines about 90% of rare earths, needed for magnets in cars, wind turbines and missiles. Its April and October 2025 export controls threatened factories worldwide, and carmakers such as Ford briefly halted lines. At Busan the US cut tariffs and paused its own measures in exchange for China suspending the October controls for a year.
Since when and why
Controls announced by China's Commerce Ministry on April 4 and October 9, 2025; the suspension was agreed at Busan on October 30, 2025.
How we know
China's Commerce Ministry notices, carmakers' 2025 warnings and shutdowns, and the White House fact sheet on the Busan deal.
What to watch
Whether China reimposes the controls if talks sour, and how fast new mines and refineries in the US, Australia and elsewhere reduce dependence.
▸Clean-energy race (solar, EVs, batteries) depends on Critical minerals and rare earthsFact
The relationship
A typical electric car needs about six times the minerals of a conventional one, mainly lithium, nickel, cobalt, manganese and graphite, and EV motors and wind turbines use rare-earth magnets. So the clean-energy race is also a mining and refining race, and China's processing dominance gives it leverage over others' transitions.
Since when and why
Supply chains run from mines in Australia, Chile, Congo and Indonesia to refineries and battery plants largely in China; the IEA flagged the risk in 2021.
How we know
The IEA's 2021 report on critical minerals and its annual Global Critical Minerals Outlook, plus manufacturers' material disclosures.
What to watch
Whether new battery chemistries, such as sodium-ion, and recycling ease demand for scarce minerals, and how quickly.