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W. V. O. Quine, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism"
1908–2000· Philosopher· Knowledge, logic & science
Well documentedSolid records, texts or physical evidence.
American logician whose 1951 paper 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' denied any sharp line between truths of meaning and truths of fact.
See it on the Philosophy map →The idea
Idea: no statement is true purely by definition and safe from experience. Philosophers split truths into analytic ('all bachelors are unmarried', true by meaning) and synthetic (true because of the facts). Quine argued the line cannot be drawn without going in circles. Our beliefs face experience 'as a corporate body', a web: a surprising result can be absorbed by revising almost any belief, even logic. Main objection: H. P. Grice and P. F. Strawson replied (1956) that the distinction works fine in ordinary use.
Why it matters
It helped end logical positivism, made philosophy continuous with science ('naturalized epistemology'), and set much of the agenda for postwar analytic philosophy.
Think of it like
Like a rent roll that will not tie out: the error could sit in any of several entries, and you choose which to correct.
Legacy and sources
'Two Dogmas' appeared in The Philosophical Review (1951) and in From a Logical Point of View (1953). Word and Object (1960) added his 'gavagai' puzzle about translation.
Still debated
Whether some form of the analytic–synthetic distinction can be rescued is still argued; many philosophers quietly go on using it.
Connections (2)
▸Pragmatism influenced W. V. O. Quine, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism"Mostly agreed
The connection
Quine ended 'Two Dogmas' by calling his view 'a more thorough pragmatism': we revise our web of beliefs by what works best for predicting experience. Like Peirce and Dewey, he treated knowledge as continuous with science and denied that any truths are fixed in advance of experience.
When and how
Harvard, where William James had taught; the last section of 'Two Dogmas' (1951) credits Carnap and C. I. Lewis with pragmatism about choosing frameworks, then pushes it further.
How sure are we?
The paper's own wording, and Quine's later essay 'The Pragmatists' Place in Empiricism' (1981). He said he owed more to Carnap, so the exact debt is uncertain.
Debates and open questions
Whether Quine belongs in the pragmatist tradition or was a scientific empiricist borrowing its vocabulary is debated by historians of American philosophy.
▸W. V. O. Quine, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" undermined Logical positivism and the Vienna CircleWell documented
The connection
Logical positivism rested on two ideas Quine attacked: a sharp split between analytic truths (true by meaning) and synthetic truths (true by fact), and the belief that each statement can be tested against experience on its own. Without them, the verification principle and the program of reducing knowledge to experience fell apart.
When and how
Quine met Carnap and the Vienna Circle in 1932–33, then read 'Two Dogmas' to the American Philosophical Association in December 1950; it was published in 1951.
How we know
The paper targets Carnap by name, Carnap replied, and historians generally treat it, along with other critiques, as the turning point that ended positivism's dominance.
Debates and open questions
Some historians argue Quine misread Carnap, for whom analyticity was a rule chosen for a formal language, not a fact to discover in ordinary speech; positivism also had internal problems of its own.