Philosophy › Contemporary › Chalmers and the hard problem of consciousness
Thomas Nagel, "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?"
1974· Book or text· Reality, mind & God
Well documentedSolid records, texts or physical evidence.
Thomas Nagel's 1974 essay arguing that physical science cannot capture what it is like, from the inside, to be a conscious creature.
See it on the Philosophy map →The idea
Idea: an organism is conscious if there is 'something it is like' to be it. Bats find their way by echolocation, a sense unlike ours. We could learn every physical fact about a bat's brain and still not know what echolocating feels like to the bat. Science describes the world from no particular viewpoint; experience is always from one. So physicalism, though perhaps true, is something we cannot yet understand. Main objection: physicalists say this shows a gap in our knowledge, not in reality.
Why it matters
Its phrase 'what it is like' became the standard way to define consciousness, and it set up the hard problem two decades later.
Where it comes from
Published in The Philosophical Review (1974) and reprinted in Mortal Questions (1979). Nagel extended the argument in The View from Nowhere (1986).
Still debated
Whether the subjective character of experience is a real feature beyond physics, or an artifact of how we think about ourselves, is still disputed.
Connections (2)
▸Thomas Nagel, "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?" anticipated Chalmers and the hard problem of consciousnessWell documented
The connection
Nagel argued that physical science, which describes things objectively, cannot capture subjective experience, 'what it is like' to be an organism. Chalmers' hard problem restates this gap two decades later and uses Nagel's phrase to define consciousness.
When and how
Nagel published the essay in 1974 while at Princeton; Chalmers, an Australian, named the hard problem in 1995.
How we know
Chalmers cites Nagel in The Conscious Mind (1996); Joseph Levine's 'explanatory gap' (1983) was another step between them.
Debates and open questions
Nagel thought a future science might close the gap; Chalmers argues no physical explanation can. Which is right is the heart of the debate.
▸Thomas Nagel, "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?" showed the subjective side of What is the mind?Mostly agreed
The connection
Theories of mind in the 1960s, like the identity theory and functionalism, explained mental states as brain events or causal roles. Nagel argued these leave out the subjective character of experience, so any answer to 'What is the mind?' must account for it or admit what it misses.
When and how
The Philosophical Review, October 1974, amid debates over identity theory and functionalism led by J. J. C. Smart, David Armstrong and Hilary Putnam.
How sure are we?
It is among the most-reprinted essays in philosophy of mind, and supporters and critics alike treat 'what it is like' as the mark of consciousness.
Debates and open questions
Some philosophers, such as Daniel Dennett, argue Nagel overstated the gap and that science can tell us a lot about what it is like to be a bat.