Philosophy › Hellenistic, Roman & Han thought › Nagarjuna and Madhyamaka (the Middle Way)
Emptiness (sunyata) and the two truths
c. AD 150· Idea or argument· Asian traditions
Mostly agreedGood evidence; some details uncertain.
Nagarjuna's teaching that nothing has a fixed, independent essence, paired with the idea of two levels of truth.
See it on the Philosophy map →The idea
Idea: things are 'empty' (sunyata; Chinese kong 空) of independent existence, not nonexistent. A chariot is real, but only as parts arranged and named; search for a separate chariot-essence and none turns up. The two truths square this with daily life: conventional truth (chariots, people, debts) works for practical purposes; ultimate truth is that none has a fixed core. Emptiness itself is empty too. Main objection: it sounds like nihilism, a charge Madhyamaka thinkers firmly deny.
Why it matters
It extends the Buddha's no-self teaching to everything and became a foundation of Mahayana thought across East Asia, from Zen to Korean Buddhism.
Think of it like
Like a corporation: real enough to sign leases and owe taxes, yet nothing apart from its people, contracts and filings.
Where it comes from
Set out in Nagarjuna's Root Verses (chapter 24 treats the two truths), building on the earlier Perfection of Wisdom sutras; the later Heart Sutra condenses it: 'form is emptiness.'
Still debated
Whether emptiness is a claim about reality or a therapy for clinging to any view is still debated by scholars and Buddhist schools.
Connections (5)
▸No-self (anatta) and impermanence was extended into Emptiness (sunyata) and the two truthsMostly agreed
The connection
The Buddha taught that a person has no permanent self, only changing parts. Early Abhidharma scholars still treated those parts (dharmas) as real building blocks. Madhyamaka extended no-self to everything: the parts too lack independent essence. Emptiness is no-self applied to the whole world.
When and how
India, from the Buddha's teaching (5th century BC) through the Abhidharma schools to Nagarjuna (c. AD 150).
How sure are we?
Madhyamaka texts explicitly distinguish 'no-self of persons' from 'no-self of phenomena' and argue against Abhidharma realism about dharmas.
Debates and open questions
Whether early Buddhist texts already implied that everything is empty, or the Mahayana added it, is debated.
▸Nagarjuna and Madhyamaka (the Middle Way) taught Emptiness (sunyata) and the two truthsWell documented
The connection
Nagarjuna gave emptiness its rigorous form. Topic by topic, he showed that cause, motion, time, self and even nirvana fall into contradiction if taken to have their own essence. His key verse: whatever arises dependently is emptiness, and that is the middle way.
When and how
India, c. AD 150–250, in the Root Verses on the Middle Way (Mulamadhyamakakarika), chapter 24.
How we know
The verses survive in Sanskrit, mainly inside Chandrakirti's commentary, and in early Chinese and Tibetan translations.
Debates and open questions
Whether he meant a claim about reality or a method for dropping all views is still debated.
▸Emptiness (sunyata) and the two truths shaped Chan (Zen) BuddhismMostly agreed
The connection
Chan inherited Madhyamaka emptiness through Chinese translations. If no concept captures reality, words and doctrines are only fingers pointing at the moon. Chan paradoxes and koans aim to make emptiness seen directly rather than understood as a theory.
When and how
China, from Kumarajiva's translations (c. 402–413) and the Three Treatise school to the Tang-dynasty Chan masters.
How sure are we?
The Platform Sutra and Chan sayings cite Perfection of Wisdom texts such as the Diamond Sutra, which Huineng reportedly heard before his awakening.
Debates and open questions
Some scholars stress Buddha-nature and Yogacara (mind-only) ideas over emptiness; their balance in Chan is debated.
▸The Kyoto School (Nishida Kitaro) drew "absolute nothingness" from Emptiness (sunyata) and the two truthsMostly agreed
The connection
Nishida Kitaro, who practiced Zen meditation for years, recast Buddhist emptiness in Western philosophical terms as 'absolute nothingness' (zettai mu): not the absence of things but the field in which all things and selves appear. His successor Nishitani Keiji went further, presenting emptiness as the way through the nihilism Nietzsche and Heidegger had diagnosed in the West.
When and how
Kyoto Imperial University, Japan: Nishida's essay 'Place' (1926) and Nishitani's Religion and Nothingness (1961).
How sure are we?
Nishida and Nishitani explicitly cite Mahayana emptiness and Zen, and Nishitani equates his key term with sunyata.
Debates and open questions
Whether 'absolute nothingness' is faithful to Madhyamaka or a new idea is debated, as is the school's entanglement with wartime Japanese nationalism.
▸Emptiness (sunyata) and the two truths was reconciled with Yogacara by Wonhyo: 'one mind' and harmonizing disputesMostly agreed
The connection
East Asian Buddhism inherited a quarrel between Madhyamaka (everything is empty) and Yogacara ('mind-only', which treats consciousness as real at some level). Wonhyo argued both are right from different angles: the one mind has an aspect of emptiness and an aspect of arising phenomena, so the schools need not conflict.
When and how
Silla Korea, 7th century, in Wonhyo's commentaries on the Awakening of Faith (Daeseung gisillon).
How sure are we?
His surviving Commentary on the Awakening of Faith (Gisillon so 起信論疏) explicitly harmonizes Madhyamaka and Yogacara positions.
Debates and open questions
Whether Wonhyo truly reconciled them, or subordinated both to the Awakening of Faith's own view, is debated.